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The court in deciding that the provisions were self-executing and that
they applied to banks of deposit as well as issue is a practical interpretation
of the Indiana Constitution and follows the decided weight of authority
in other states that have very similar provisions. Brodie v. Pollock, 110
Nebr. 844, 195 N. W. 457; Dupey v. Swigert, 127 Ill. 294, 21 N. E. 622;
Austin v. Campbell, (Texas) 210 S. W. 277.
R. R. D.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS ON ASSESSMENT
RoLL-The board of public works on November 9, 1915 approved a final
assessment roll on the real estate of the appellees, among others, delivered
it to the comptroller of Indianapolis, and issued a duplicate to the treasurer
of the said city. Notices of final assessment were sent to the property
owners, including appellees. After this the board undertook to make and
adopt a supplementary or modified assessment roll without notice to or
consent of appellees and they set this up as a defense in this action to
foreclose the improvement lien, which is for the paving and curbing ol
West Tenth street in Indianapolis. Held, the supplementary assessment
roll was invalid; judgment for appellees affirmed. Butner v. McQuillin,
Appellate Court of Indiana, Sept. 25, 1930, 172 N. E. 658.
In its opinion the court said: "The facts of this case are similar in
all essential respects to the case of Vandergrifft (Board of Public Works)
v. State ex rel. Sudbrock, 199 Ind. 210, 156 N. E. 465 . . . and upon the
authority of that case the judgment is affirmed." In that case which concerned appropriation of land for widening a street, the board of public
works after finally approving the assessment roll which awarded Sudbrock
$1,400 damages and $140 benefits, sent to the finance department of the
city a final assessment roll which showed that Sudbrock was awarded only
$1,000 damages and assessed benefits amounting to $500. When he protested, the board refused to deliver a true and correct copy of the original
assessment roll to the finance department, but instead attempted to rescind
the entire improvement scheme and all proceedings under it. The Supreme
Court held it could not do this, being a court of special or limited jurisdiction, and that it was bound to transmit to the finance department a true
copy of the assessment roll that it first approved. This case was governed
by the statutes relating to appropriation of property, sections 8704-8706,
8709, Burns' Supp. 1921; which are sections 10355, 10357, 10360 Burns Ann.
St. 1926. These sections provide that the assessment or award shall attach
to each piece of property and notice thereof be given to the owner; that he
shall remonstrate if he chooses; that after remonstrances have been received the board shall sustain or modify the assessments or awards and
from this action the property owner may appeal to the courts; that on
completion of such assessment roll the board shall deliver it to the department of finance, from which time the benefits, if in. excess of the damages,
shall be a lien on the property next to taxes; and that the person awarded
damages in excess of benefits is entitled to a warrant from the finance
department drawn on the city treasurer.
While the Vandergrifft case concerned the appropriation of property,
the instant case concerns only the improvement of a street already laid
out. Hence, although they were not cited in the opinion, the statutes which
should govern this case must be those relating to street improvement, sec-
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tions 10440 to 10449 Burns' Ann. St. 1926. These sections are similar in
all respects to those relating to appropriation of property with the exception
that no provision, of course, is made for awarding of damages in excess of
benefits, but that on completion and acceptance of the work (of improvement) by the board of public works a certified duplicate assessment roll
is to be delivered to the finance department and to the city treasurer, who
shall collect thereon; and with this further exception (section 10448) that:
"In case of any defect or irregularity which results or has resulted in the
invalidity . . .of any assessment or assessments or the lien thereof, such
defect or irregularity shall be remedied, supplied or corrected by supplementary proceedings had or taken in conformity to the provisions of this
act. . . ." Acts 1905, p. 292; as amended Acts 1925, p. 211. It would
seem to be self-evident from a mere cursory reading of the act dealing with
appropriation of land that any supplementary assessment would be illegal.
Were the street improvements statutes as explicit, the court would be justified in granting scant attention to this appeal. But there is possibility
under sec. 10448 that the action of the board of public works might have
been justified, as in Curless v. Watson, 54 Ind. App. 110, 100 N. E. 576,
which upheld supplemental proceedings correcting a defective assessment.
Whether the principal case could have come within this section, however,
is not known inasmuch as the court neither cited this statute nor gave the
reason for the attempted supplemental assessment-which assessment, it
is possible, may have been an attempt to correct a defect beneficial to the
appellee.
Cases decided under old statutes may not be in point in the principal
case, which involves the interpretation of a new statute, but they indicate
the tendency of opinion toward supplementary proceedings and assessments.
Ball v. Balfe, 41 Ind. 221, held that the final estimate and assessment for
street improvement may be amended or corrected by the common council of
a city, but after an order is made for the improvement and it is determined what property will be benefited thereby, the line of improvement
cannot be extended and such property charged with the expense thereof.
City of Columbus v. Stovey, 35 Ind. 97. Nor can the estimate for improvements be increased at the stage of issuing and marketing bonds.
Porter v. City of Tipton, 141 Ind. 347, 40 N. E. 802. Under Burns' R. S.
1894, sec. 4293, the court decided in Becker v.B. & 0. Ry. Co., 17 Ind. App.
324, 46 N. E. 685 that an erroneous or invalid assessment for street improvements could, upon proper application to the common council or board
of trustees, be amended. A case in accord with the Vandergrifft case,
supra, is Gorman v. State ex rel. Koester, 157 Ind. 205, 60 N. E. 1083,
which held that after the assessment roll has been approved by the board
of works and a copy delivered to the finance department, a court cannot
compel such board to make a new assessment for such sum as the court may
deem right. The case implies that even if the board was willing to
abide by the order of the court it could not do so, for if its final assessment was unlawful it cannot amend it, but must proceed to make a completely new assessment. A board of public works may make another
assessment when the first assessment for street improvement is void.
Helin v.Witz, 35 Ind. App. 131; 73 N. E. 846.
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Other jurisdictions have freely permitted the correction of errors and
defects in assessments. Hooker v. City of Rochester, 30 N. Y. Supp. 297;
Carrigerv. Town of Morristown, 148 Tenn. 585, 256 S. W. 883. In Illinois
it was held proper to permit the city treasurer's report and tax judgment
sale and redemption record to be amended on an application for judgment
and order of sale for the delinquent assessments. Ottis v. Sullivan, 219
Ill. 365, 76 N. E. 487. An even stronger case is PattersonV.Corp. of N. Y.
(1828), 1 Paige 114, which held that where the assessment commissioners
had deposited their report in the clerk's office and later had altered it
without notice to the parties, notice of the alteration to the parties assessed
was not necessary, or, if required, the omission was not such an irregularity as could be inquired into in chancery. These cases simply illustrate
the irregularities and defects of assessments which sec. 10448 was designed
to correct by giving to the board of public works the power to take supplementary proceedings to that end. Inasmuch as the question involved is
purely one of statutory construction, the action of the court in affirming
the judgment without citing the statutes involved, resting its decision on
a single case decided under an entirely different set of statutes, albeit they
were "essentially similar" and so of strong persuasive authority, is not
J. W. S.
quite as satisfactory as might be desired.
PLEADING-APPEAL AND ERROR-THEORY OF THE CAsE-The complaint
showed that the plaintiff attempted to charge as negligence acts constituting a violation of section 2903 Burns' Ann. St. 1926, and also undertook
to allege common law negligence. Defendant's demurrer for insufficient
facts was overruled. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the trial court
and defendant appeals. Held, reversed, with instructions to sustain appellant's motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is not sustained
by sufficien evidence. (For comment on this point see 6 Indiana Law
Journal 125.) The overruling of a demurrer for insufficient facts is not
reversible error where evidence is introduced covering the deficincy and
the case was fairly tried and determined on the merits. Cleveland, C. C. &
St. L. Ry. Co. v. Gillespie, Appellate Court of Indiana, June 27, 1930,
173 N. E. 708.
This decision, as have others of the more recent decisions, properly
gives effect to section 725 Burns' Ann. Ind. St. 1926 which provides, "No
judgment shall be stayed or reversed, in whole or in part, by the Supreme
Court, for any defect in form, variance or imperfection contained in the
record, pleadings, process, entries, returns, or other proceedings therein,
which, by law, might be amended by the court below, but such defects shall
be deemed to be amended in the Supreme Court; nor shall any judgment
be stayed or reversed, in whole or in part, where it shall appear to the
court that the merits of the cause have been fairly tried and determined
in the court below." Such decisions, however, seem to be irreconcilable
with the doctrine of the theory of the case as lieretofore applied in Indiana;
e. g., Union City v. Murphy (1911), 176 Ind. 597, 96 N. E. 584. That doctrine is that the pleader must have and maintain in his pleadings a definite
theory of his case, and judgment can be given in his favor only on that
theory and no other. Clark on Code Pleading, 174; Mescall v. Tully, 91
Ind. 96, 99. The question suggests itself as to whether or not it shall be

